Failure of Darfur Peace Talks in Abuja
1-
Introduction:
The
origin of the current conflict in Darfur that
began in the early 1980s can be traced to two major developments. (i) Since Sudan became
independent, Darfur has suffered from
negligence of power sharing and lack of development by successive Governments
that failed to address the genuine constitutional procedures for the country
and the economic disparity between the region and the rest of the Sudan. (ii) The
policy of deliberate marginalization caused Darfurian people to establish
political organizations in the late 1950s and in the mid-1960s, demanding
economic development for the region and political representation in the centre.
But instead of addressing the negligence and its associated injustices, the
Governments plunged the region into inter-ethnic conflicts, thus the ruling
elites in Sudan
(the Riverian Arabs) have been successful in implementing their policy of
divide and rule in Darfur. To that end the
Sudanese Government’s adopted policies of by-proxy war in Darfur, hence
genocide, ethnic cleansing and earth scorching has become a common practice by
the Khartoum regime in Darfur
(using Arab militias “Janjaweed” against African indigenous tribes).
Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) took
up arms against the Government of the Sudan (GoS) in protest at the perceived
lack of government protection against attacks on sedentary groups, thus SLM/A
has been created in response to those challenges and the general policy of
marginalization and deprivation by Khartoum Governments.
Sudan Liberation Movement/Army -Abdul Wahid- (SLM/A-A) is aware that the
current conflict in Darfur is of political
nature and cannot be resolved through military means. It recognizes that a deal
can only be achieved through negotiated political settlement to ensure a
lasting peace, but the deal on the table at Abuja was not the right deal.
2-
The Recent Political Movements
in Darfur:
The political movements in the
recent history of Darfur include (1) The Red
Flame (Al-Laheeb Al-Ahmar) established in 1957. This was an underground
movement established just one year after the independence of the Sudan, with the
main objective being to enlighten the people of Darfur
about the negligence using hand written leaflets. (2) Sooney Movement of
1963/64, which was lead by Darfurian army veterans who fought in the civil war
in Southern Sudan. They came back to Darfur convinced that the civil war in this part of the
country is illegal and immoral, and they established their own movement in Darfur to address the issue of marginalization. (3)
Darfur Development Front (DDF) established in 1964/65. The main objective was
to demand economic development projects and the independency of political
decisions from the Centre. DDF still has some active members in the field of
regional development. (4) Western Sudan People’s Organization (WSPO) 1977/79,
an opposition movement established in Diaspora, it become a member of the
National Front which opposed Nemeiri’s Regime in the 1970s. (5) Darfur Popular
Uprising of 1980, which was a popular uprising held in El Fasher, the
historical capital of Darfur, to protest against the appointment of an outsider
as Governor of the Region of Darfur. (6) Darfur People’s Demonstration (Khartoum), 1988, another
popular demonstration in the heart of Khartoum
protesting against Government policies which allowed troops from foreign
countries to fight in the soil of Darfur. (7)
SPLM/A led by late Dawood Yahya Boulad in 1990/91, which was an expansion of
the SPLM/A in Darfur. (8) Sudan Federal
Democratic Alliance (SFDA) of 1994, established by western Sudanese in Diaspora
to replace the opposition group of the National Democratic Alliance and to advocate for a different, more stable and inclusive
political system so as to address the very problems which brought about the
current conflict and the fall of the previous national governments. And (9) the Sudan
Liberation Movement/A (SLM/A), and
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) both appearing in 2003. Both Movements are
calling for a New Sudan and aiming to address the root causes of the conflict
and the constitutional issues such as the system of governance, Human rights,
separation of religious and political affairs, just and fair economic
development for the marginalized areas. Thus it is obvious that the present
movements evolved from natural and continuous resistance to the deliberate
marginalization and negligence of the region.
3-
Objectives of the Peace Talks:
The SLM/A
is fully convinced that the current conflict in Darfur
is of a political nature; therefore it can only be resolved through peaceful
negotiation. Accordingly, it accepted and attended all rounds of the Peace
Talks to negotiate with good faith on the grounds that the negotiation will
address the root causes of the conflict in Darfur in order to reach a fair and
just agreement which would smoothly be implemented by the parties who will sign
it, and ultimately this agreement would lead to a sustainable peace in the
region and the country at large.
4-
The Process of the Peace
Talks:
The process of the
Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks on the conflict in Darfur
started as early as May 2001 in Darfur, even
before the SLM/A declared itself
by this name. Since then till December 2002, a total of 5 meetings of Peace
Talks were held between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Movement in
different places in Darfur, mainly in El
Fasher and the Jabel Marra area. In all these meetings the Movement put forward
on the negotiating table three main issues for discussion. These were (i) Just
political representation in the region and the centre (ii) Fair economic and
social development in Darfur and (iii)
Cessation of divide and rule policies by inciting some tribes against others.
Then after the Movement declared itself officially in early 2003, another 3
meetings were held and the demands were upgraded. It is worth mentioning that
in all these rounds the GoS has rejected all demands put forward by the
Movement, refusing to admit that this is a political conflict, instead the GoS
continue describing members of the Movement as armed robbers, bandits, or
describing the conflict as a tribal one.
In September 4th, 2003 the venue of
the peace talks was moved to Abeche (Chad), so the solution of the
conflict was internationalized. The first round under the auspices of African
Union (AU) Mediation was in April
8th, 2004 in N’Djamena (Chad) where a ceasefire was signed.
After that an agreement on the modalities for the establishment of the
ceasefire commission and deployment of observers in the Darfur
was signed in Addis Ababa
(Ethiopia)
on 28 May 2004.
The following six successive rounds were held in Abuja (Nigeria) where two
Protocols on the (i) Implementation of the Humanitarian Situation in Darfur and
(ii) Enhancement of the Security Situation in Darfur, were both signed in
November 9th, 2004, and in the following year the Declaration of
Principles (DoP) for the Resolution of the Sudanese Conflict in Darfur was
signed on July 5th, 2005. The issues of discussion in the DoP can be
classified into three categories (i) recognition and accommodation of the fact
that Sudan is a composition of multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-culture
society; affirmation of rights such as tribal land ownership and other
historical rights of Darfur; human rights and citizenship as the base for civil
and political rights and duties. (ii) Continue negotiations on other issues
such as power-sharing, wealth-sharing, sustainable development; rehabilitation
and reconstruction of Darfur, humanitarian
assistance, security arrangement …etc, and (iii) the agreement reached by the
parties shall be incorporated into the National Constitution.
To expedite the Talks the AU
Mediation redesigned the DoP to be negotiated in three commissions i.e. Power
Sharing, Wealth Sharing and Security Arrangement. Since November 2005, the
seventh round of the Peace Talks lasted five and half (5 ˝) months, which ended
up with the signature of two parties and the objection of another two parties
(Movements). The reasons of rejection by those Parties who didn’t sign may be
summarized as follows:
5-
Reasons of Rejection:
The procedure of negotiation
that was adopted by the AU Mediation has contributed in a great manner to the
failure of the Peace Talks, in a sense that the Mediation cornered the
Movements to the issues of Darfur only. Also
the international community had made it clear that they did not want to see any
obstruction to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 9/1/2005. Therefore, the AU Mediation
was unable to accept any proposals from Movements related to the resolution of
the root causes of the conflict; in the end it admits that this Agreement is
not taking the people of Darfur to a genuine
peace settlement but it is one step forward for peace. This is even obvious in
the Darfur Peace Agreement signed on 5/5/2006, which says in the preamble “RESOLVED that
the signing of this Agreement shall be a significant step towards a just,
peaceful and lasting political solution to the conflict in Darfur”.
The Sudan
Liberation Movement/Army –Abdulwahid- (SLM/A-A),
have genuine reasons when it rejected the unfinished job and unfair deal
presented by the AU Mediation on 5
May 2006. The reasons may be brought under three categories i.e (A)
Procedural (B) Legal and (C) Technical:
A- Procedural:
(1) The AU Mediation had
decided to classify the negotiation process into three commissions: Power
Sharing, Wealth Sharing and Security Arrangement, and further decided to
proceed in the negotiations of these Commissions in a concurrent manner. The
main concern of the Movements was that this procedure would create great
confusion and would not lead to fair results, e.g. lands in Darfur constitute a
critical issue for Darfurians, it is highly valued as political power and a
source of generating wealth, not only the fact the current conflict is
basically over land. Therefore, any discussion over the land issue in the three
Commissions should not be in a concurrent manner, it should be negotiated in
first place in one Commission, preferably Power Sharing in order to establish a
reference to the other two Commissions. The same is true of the issue of the
Darfur Region.
(2) The AU Mediation concluded
in February 2006 that there is no need for more plenary; accordingly they
decided to produce one compiled document for the Parties to sign. Since then
there were no formal negotiations, particularly in the Wealth Sharing and Power
Sharing Commissions. As a result there were many issues in all Commissions left
out. The legitimate question is on what basis the Movement has to sign an agreement
which it did not participate in discussing?
(3) The compiled document was
prepared 6 weeks before it was presented to the Movements on 25th April 2006, but it
was kept in AU drawers, and then presented to the Movements when they were
given just 5 days to respond and sign it. Bear in mind that there were issues
that had not previously been discussed at all.
(4) The AU Mediation proposed
the formation of a core team from all Parties to be locked up in a separate
place for a few days to resolve the issues of difference, or at least put them
in a compromise formation for making a decision, but though the Movements
accepted the proposal, sadly it was not given any chance.
(5) Darfur Peace Agreement is
very important to the whole nation and to the people of Darfur,
in particular as it can shake up the political and economic future of Darfur. Because of that the Movement had officially
requested the AU Mediation to grant it three weeks to carefully study the
document before presenting its comments. The Mediation team rejected the
request, which shows another indication that AU was adamant not to reach a
genuine agreement.
B- Legal: The following
procedures being followed by the AU Mediation are considered illegal in the
viewpoint of the Movement.
(1) The compiled document
presented to the Movement on 25/4/2006 was not complete as it lacked at that
date implementation modalities in all Commissions, and also three crucial
issues were not discussed at all, the implementation mechanisms, general
provisions and guarantees. Above all the Movement had been given an ultimatum
of five days to sign the document or leave it, and this is clearly against the
prevailing understanding of negotiation norms worldwide, which allow the
parties to negotiate every issue and reach a compromise position where
everybody can be a winner.
(2) In the case of such
agreements, definitions of key words and phrases are of paramount importance as
they directly affect the implementation of the agreement. However, the Movement
realized that some words were not correctly defined; this will adversely
reflect in the interpretation during the implementation process e.g. Janjaweed,
Hawakeer (communal land ownership rights) and Massaratt (Livestock routes).
(3) This Agreement gives GoS
(National Congress Party, NCP) absolute power to rule Darfur;
it got 81% of constitutional and executive posts (State Governors, Ministers,
Commissioners …etc) and 71% of legislative seats in Darfur.
This means that in the eyes of the international law the licence of
implementing this agreement is completely under the control of the NCP, and let
us remind ourselves of the fact that this Government is accused by the
international community of committing genocide and ethnic cleansing in Darfur,
and many of its senior members including Officials from Darfur are suspected by
the International Criminal Court of committing crimes against humanity and war
crimes. So how can such a Government implement an agreement aimed to bring
peace and stability to the region?
(4)There is clear legal
offence by the AU Mediation in terms of the deletion of some issues already
agreed upon by the Parties in separate commissions e.g. in Wealth Sharing
Commission Article 21 URGENT PROGRAMS FOR INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPs),
REFUGEES AND OTHER WAR-AFFECTED
PERSONS AND COMPENSATION FOR
WAR-AFFECTED PERSONS there are paragraphs and sub-paragraphs completely deleted
(i) a total of five paragraphs under sub-title Definitions were deleted (ii)
the underlined part of paragraph 205 was deleted “205. Taking note of the
suffering of the individual people of Darfur,
and the customary practices of tribal restitution in Darfur,
the Commission shall work out principles for appropriate restitution or other
compensation for individuals, communities and economic entities. In
doing so, the Commission shall take into account, among other considerations:”
and (iii) also in paragraph 207 Sub-Para “207 (i) Satisfaction,
including public apology” was deleted. The most critical point was that
many paragraphs of 25/4/2006
Document were deleted in the 5/5/2006
Document. A good example is under Definitions. Almost all words and phrases
related to Wealth Sharing and Power Sharing Commissions were deleted and in
particular those critical words like Hawakeer, Janjaweed and Massaratt, even
though their initial definitions were not acceptable in the first place.
(5) It had been agreed that
all documents should be originated in the English language and that Arabic and
French copies had to be translated from it. However, the Arabic version was not
correctly translated in many parts e.g. the Wealth Sharing Commission indicates
that IDPs and Refugees have no rights for compensation; also the word
Commission translated to give the meaning of committee and in that sense Compensation
Committee shall be established rather than Compensation Commission, which is
precisely what was meant by the negotiating Parties.
C- Technical: The security and
humanitarian situation has dominated the technical side of the negotiations, in
that the AU Mediation adopted the agenda of the International Community, aiming
to achieve (i) safeguard the CPA (ii) help to get Sudanese Government approval
to bring UN troops to Darfur and (iii) help to
bring sufficient aid to the needy people. Therefore, less attention has been
given to the Power Sharing Commission, which meant to resolve the root causes
of the conflict in Darfur.
(1) There were three issues
out of nine in the agenda of the Power Sharing Commission which were not
discussed at any level of the negotiation process and they are General
Provisions, Implementation Mechanisms and Guarantees.
(2) There is no inclusion of
solutions to the root causes in this Document, and these are mainly of
political nature (i) Darfur as one region with
its borders of 1/1/1956.
The sole objective of the ruling elites
in Sudan
(Riverian Arabs) is to destroy the culture and identity of Darfur.
The reaction from the people of Darfur to that
objective was to take up arms against such damaging policies. In the DoP there
is a paragraph that says…Tribal Land
ownership” hawakeer” and other historical rights shall be affirmed within their
historical borders… this principle has not been achieved in the DPA. (ii) Fair representation
in both legislative and executive bodies at a national level and majority
representation of the Movements at a regional level in both legislative and
executive organs during the interim period. (iii) Participation of Movements in
the process of disarming the Janjaweed with a specific timetable and effective
guarantees.
(3) Some essential rights of
Darfurians were not sufficiently addressed (i) Individual compensation where
the GoS shall put immediately after the signing of the DPA a significant amount
of money into the Darfur Compensation Fund (ii) The duration of the interim
period (iii) Movements shall control their forces over the interim period
before the UN Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration programme (DDR) takes place.
(4) The implementation of this
kind of agreement is the responsibility of the parties who sign it; therefore
the representation of the parties should be in a fair and just manner. In the
DPA the Movements are represented by only 19% in Darfur’s
executive organs, and by 29% in its legislative bodies. It is clear that those
who took up arms against the Islamic ideologist government in Sudan have no
room in the governing process of their own region to correct the injustice
practices and elevate the suffering of their people.
(5) There is no provision in
the DPA to allow a UN Peacekeeping Force in Darfur
after the signing of the Agreement.
6- Recommendations:
The SLM/A-A
offered a proposal immediately after the signature of the Agreement aiming to
add a supplementary deal to the document which would address unresolved issues,
but the AU failed to sell it to the GoS and the international community. In a
late development Mr. Jan Pronk, the UN Secretary General Special Envoy to Sudan,
supported this proposal by admitting that “...the deal was severely
paralysed and needed major additions to bring dissident rebels on board and
stop it collapsing...”
(1) The SLM/A competent under the control of Abdul Wahid includes
Jebel Marra, West Darfur, South
Darfur and a significant part of North Darfur.
In addition almost all members of the Fur tribe are supporting Abdul Wahid’s
side of SLM/A-A; therefore it is
important to bring this group on board the peace process by looking again at
their demands and addressing them in a genuine manner.
(2) The demonstrations in
protest of the DPA carried out in the IDP Camps in Sudan, Refugee Camps in
eastern Chad, and students in Khartoum, saw 8 persons killed in the month of
May 2006 alone, under the brutal treatment of GoS’s security services; sending crucial
signals to the world that this Agreement does not satisfactorily address
peoples’ demands nor fulfil their rights, so it will not bring peace to Darfur
and Sudan at large. Therefore, it is high time to reconsider it, and that will
be a brave and great decision for the International Community to take.
(3) Issues of land and region
are inseparable and constitute the core of the conflict in Darfur;
accordingly priority must be given to address these issues if a genuine
resolution to the conflict is considered a real target to achieve.
(4) The fact that Sudanese
politicians have failed to resolve the root causes of the problem in Sudan i.e.
constitutional issues. If the present conflict is not resolved in a way that it
might please the majority of Darfurians, new military and political movements
will arise bearing more radical ideas, which may not be in favour of everybody.
(5) As far as a UN
Peacekeeping Force is concerned, which should come as soon as possible with a
full mandate to use all necessary means to protect civilians and react rapidly
to ceasefire violations or provocations by any party, to do this properly it is
advisable to include among these forces a sizable number of European and North
American soldiers as they are better equipped and professionally disciplined,
and above all they are better respected by the GoS and its associated Janjaweed
militias.
(6) AU Mediation has proven
incompetent of conducting the Darfur Peace Negotiation; therefore, an
experienced organization like UN or IGAD is needed to carry out future
mediation processes in order to reach a successful peace settlement in Darfur.
(7) Darfur
– Darfur Dialogue and Consultation is meant to brief people of Darfur and get their support during the implementation of
the peace agreement, but not to give them the right to reopen the negotiation
nor responsibility of implementation. It is advisable to be understood in this
context, rather than assuming that it might come up with a new agreement. This
Dialogue is the first step towards inter-tribal reconciliation and ultimately
peaceful coexistence in the region.
(8) Unless the Government admit that the
current conflict in Darfur is political, we
can not reach a peace settlement, not only in Darfur
but in the whole country.
APPENDIX A
MAP OF SUDAN
the Government is still
adamant to manoeuvre around this, it may encourage most Darfurians to take up
the demand for self-determination.
(9) Finally we as negotiators
have been blamed by our people that we did not ask for self-determination in
the DoP, we had our reasons at that time, but if
Abaker Mohamed Abuelbashar
Head of Wealth Sharing
Commission
Sudan Liberation
Movement/Army-Abdulwahid
Manchester, United Kingdom
E-mail: abuelbashar2002@yahoo.co.uk
Friday, 30 June 2006